Understanding the physical and economic consequences of attacks on control systems

Yu-Lun Huang*, Alvaro A. Cárdenas, Saurabh Amin, Zong Syun Lin, Hsin Yi Tsai, Shankar Sastry

*Corresponding author for this work

研究成果: Article同行評審

107 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This paper describes an approach for developing threat models for attacks on control systems. These models are useful for analyzing the actions taken by an attacker who gains access to control system assets and for evaluating the effects of the attacker's actions on the physical process being controlled. The paper proposes models for integrity attacks and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and evaluates the physical and economic consequences of the attacks on a chemical reactor system. The analysis reveals two important points. First, a DoS attack does not have a significant effect when the reactor is in the steady state; however, combining the DoS attack with a relatively innocuous integrity attack rapidly causes the reactor to move to an unsafe state. Second, an attack that seeks to increase the operational cost of the chemical reactor involves a radically different strategy than an attack on plant safety (i.e., one that seeks to shut down the reactor or cause an explosion).

原文English
頁(從 - 到)73-83
頁數11
期刊International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection
2
發行號3
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 1 十月 2009

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