Modeling government subsidies and project risk for financially non-viable build-operate-transfer (bot) projects

Fen May Liou, Ch-Hpin Huang*, Borliang Chen

*Corresponding author for this work

研究成果: Article同行評審

14 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

Governments encourage private sector participation in building infrastructure through Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) agreements. Large projects may be financially non-viable despite their net economic benefits for the host society. Host governments might subsidize initial private investments to create financial feasibility. Small-scale subsidies might not sufficiently reduce project risks to attract private investment; however, large percentage subsidies might result in loose profit structures, discouraging the pursuit of efficiency. This article applies Monte Carlo techniques to data from the Taiwanese West Corridor High-Speed Rail Project to assess the subsidy-risk trade-off relationship. The results provide guidance for public-private negotiations.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)58-64
頁數7
期刊EMJ - Engineering Management Journal
24
發行號1
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 1 三月 2012

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