Directors network centrality and earnings quality

Bright Gershion Godigbe, Chin Man Chui*, Chih Liang Liu

*Corresponding author for this work

研究成果: Article同行評審

2 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This study examines whether firms with network central boards of directors behave differently from other firms in terms of financial reporting quality. We find that earnings quality among firms is low when board networks are channels of incorrect information transmission (including earnings management information) and for firms whose directors are awarded equity-based compensation have connections through boardroom networks, but earnings quality is better for firms with good performance in spite of their networks. These results are robust to controlling for firm information environment, growth, size, age, leverage, performance, volatility in firm operations, and corporate governance.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)5381-5400
頁數20
期刊Applied Economics
50
發行號50
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 27 十月 2018

指紋 深入研究「Directors network centrality and earnings quality」主題。共同形成了獨特的指紋。

引用此