Coordinating a Service Supply Chain under Arms Offset Program's Intervention by Performance-Based Contracting

Yi-Kuei Lin*, Jong Jang Lin, Ruey Huei Yeh

*Corresponding author for this work

研究成果: Article

1 引文 斯高帕斯(Scopus)

摘要

This paper investigates a support service supply chain for coordinating with a local third-party logistics provider by arms offset program's intervention and develops a performance-based contracting framework for the coordinating problem, which remains scarce in the literatures. The performance-based contracting framework evaluates payments and profits for the support service by a game-theoretical approach with principal-agent model. We prove that the proposed framework is an effective tool in acquiring the balance between maximum profit and minimum payment for both parties in the coordinating problem without moral hazard issue. A numerical study consolidates the formulated schemes as contracting preference for both parties' decision with a higher profit margin at a lower customer's payment.

原文English
文章編號8590371
期刊Mathematical Problems in Engineering
2016
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 1 一月 2016

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