Authenticated key agreement protocols are a foundation for delivering an authenticated session key between the intended two-party participants from a set of parties over an insecure network. Wang et al proposed protocol ECKE-1N to overcome KCI-R attacks in ECKE-1 as an implicit authenticated key agreement protocol based on Diffie-Hellman elliptic curve. In this paper, we show that ECKE-1N is vulnerable to both leakage of ephemeral private keys and KCI-R attacks. We present an enhanced protocol EECKE-1N, which can withstand KCI-R attacks and revelations both of ephemeral keys. Furthermore, EECKE-1N can provide desirable security proprieties.
|Number of pages||5|
|State||Published - May 2009|
|Event||1st International Conference on E-Business and Information System Security - Wuhan, China|
Duration: 23 May 2009 → 24 May 2009
|Conference||1st International Conference on E-Business and Information System Security|
|Period||23/05/09 → 24/05/09|