Uncovering attacks on security protocols

Wuu Yang*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Security protocols are indispensable in secure communication. We give an operational semantics of security protocols in terms of a Prolog-like language. With this semantics, we can uncover attacks on a security protocol that are possible with no more than a given number of rounds. Though our approach is exhaustive testing, the majority of fruitless search is cut off by selecting a small number of representative values that could be sent by an attacker. Hence, the number of scenarios is relatively small and our method is quite practical. Furthermore, our method not only reports possible attacks but also describes the attacks in great detail. This description would be very helpful to protocol designers and analyzers.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 3rd International Conference on Information Technology and Applications, ICITA 2005
Pages572-575
Number of pages4
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2005
Event3rd International Conference on Information Technology and Applications, ICITA 2005 - Sydney, Australia
Duration: 4 Jul 20057 Jul 2005

Publication series

NameProceedings - 3rd International Conference on Information Technology and Applications, ICITA 2005
VolumeII

Conference

Conference3rd International Conference on Information Technology and Applications, ICITA 2005
CountryAustralia
CitySydney
Period4/07/057/07/05

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