The robust price of anarchy of altruistic games

Po-An Chen; Bart De Keijzer; David Kempe; Guido Schäfer

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6-33

The robust price of anarchy of altruistic games

Po-An Chen^*, Bart De Keijzer, David Kempe, Guido Schäfer

^*Corresponding author for this work

Institute of Information Management

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the inefficiency of equilibria for several classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1-α _i times his direct cost and α_i times the social cost. Tuning the parameters α _i allows smooth interpolation between purely selfish and purely altruistic behavior. Within this framework, we study altruistic extensions of cost-sharing games, utility games, and linear congestion games. Our main contribution is an adaptation of Roughgarden's smoothness notion to altruistic extensions of games. We show that this extension captures the essential properties to determine the robust price of anarchy of these games, and use it to derive mostly tight bounds.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Proceedings
Pages	383-390
Number of pages	8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6-33
State	Published - 12 Dec 2011
Event	7th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2011 - Singapore, Singapore Duration: 11 Dec 2011 → 14 Dec 2011

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	7090 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	7th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2011
Country	Singapore
City	Singapore
Period	11/12/11 → 14/12/11

Access to Document

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Chen, P-A., De Keijzer, B., Kempe, D., & Schäfer, G. (2011). The robust price of anarchy of altruistic games. In Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Proceedings (pp. 383-390). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 7090 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6-33

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abstract = "We study the inefficiency of equilibria for several classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1-α i times his direct cost and αi times the social cost. Tuning the parameters α i allows smooth interpolation between purely selfish and purely altruistic behavior. Within this framework, we study altruistic extensions of cost-sharing games, utility games, and linear congestion games. Our main contribution is an adaptation of Roughgarden's smoothness notion to altruistic extensions of games. We show that this extension captures the essential properties to determine the robust price of anarchy of these games, and use it to derive mostly tight bounds.",

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Chen, P-A, De Keijzer, B, Kempe, D & Schäfer, G 2011, The robust price of anarchy of altruistic games. in Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7090 LNCS, pp. 383-390, 7th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2011, Singapore, Singapore, 11/12/11. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6-33

The robust price of anarchy of altruistic games. / Chen, Po-An; De Keijzer, Bart; Kempe, David; Schäfer, Guido.

Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Proceedings. 2011. p. 383-390 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 7090 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Chen P-A, De Keijzer B, Kempe D, Schäfer G. The robust price of anarchy of altruistic games. In Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Proceedings. 2011. p. 383-390. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6-33