The robust price of anarchy of altruistic games

Po-An Chen*, Bart De Keijzer, David Kempe, Guido Schäfer

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the inefficiency of equilibria for several classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1-α i times his direct cost and αi times the social cost. Tuning the parameters α i allows smooth interpolation between purely selfish and purely altruistic behavior. Within this framework, we study altruistic extensions of cost-sharing games, utility games, and linear congestion games. Our main contribution is an adaptation of Roughgarden's smoothness notion to altruistic extensions of games. We show that this extension captures the essential properties to determine the robust price of anarchy of these games, and use it to derive mostly tight bounds.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Proceedings
Pages383-390
Number of pages8
DOIs
StatePublished - 12 Dec 2011
Event7th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2011 - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: 11 Dec 201114 Dec 2011

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume7090 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference7th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2011
CountrySingapore
CitySingapore
Period11/12/1114/12/11

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