Abstract
We create a novel measure of market-nurtured optimism in that managers become more optimistic if the market had responded more favorably, and to a larger extent to positive earnings surprises, than to negative earnings surprises. These market-nurtured managers are prone to engage in value-destructive mergers. The inclination is further reinforced by abundant internal cash. In contrast, a good governance structure mitigates the odds of engaging in mergers and the detrimental effect associated with mergers. The acquisitions launched by overconfident managers are associated with lower market value.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 1350021 |
Journal | Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies |
Volume | 16 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Sep 2013 |
Keywords
- Overconfidence
- corporate governance
- mergers