Risk-taking of bank CEOs and corporate innovation

Dien Giau Bui*, Yehning Chen, Chih Yung Lin, Tse Chun Lin

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We find that banks with CEOs who postpone exercising deep in-the-money options are more likely to lend to firms that are smaller, riskier, and more engaged in corporate innovation. These borrowers also spend more on R&D than a matched sample after getting the loans. Subsequently, these borrowers have higher innovation outputs and achieve greater market valuations. Overall, our findings suggest that the bank CEOs who reveal a high risk-taking attitude by their option exercising behavior help facilitate technological progress via the syndicate loans.

Original languageEnglish
Article number102387
JournalJournal of International Money and Finance
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - 2021

Keywords

  • Bank syndicate loan
  • CEO risk-taking attitude
  • Corporate innovation
  • R&D
  • Tobin's q

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