Provable Secure AKA scheme with reliable key delegation in UMTS

Yu-Lun Huang*, C. Y. Shen, Shiuh-Pyng Shieh, Hung Jui Wang, Cheng Chun Lin

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

The Authentication Key Agreement Scheme (AKA) of Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) provides substantial enhancement to solve the vulnerabilities in GSM and other wireless communication systems. However, we discovered four security weaknesses of UMTS AKA, that is, redirection attack, man-in-the-middle attack, sequence number depletion, and roaming attack. An adversary can launch these attacks to eavesdrop, or cause billing problems. To cope with these problems, a new Secure Authentication Key Agreement Protocol (S-AKA) is proposed in this paper to enhance the security to resist the attacks. To improve the efficiency and redundancy of UMTS AKA, S-AKA reduces both the authentication messages and bandwidth consumption of UMTS AKA. The formal proof of S-AKA is also given to ensure the security strength of S-AKA.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSSIRI 2009 - 3rd IEEE International Conference on Secure Software Integration Reliability Improvement
Pages243-252
Number of pages10
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2009
Event3rd IEEE International Conference on Secure Software Integration Reliability Improvement, SSIRI 2009 - Shanghai, China
Duration: 8 Jul 200910 Jul 2009

Publication series

NameSSIRI 2009 - 3rd IEEE International Conference on Secure Software Integration Reliability Improvement

Conference

Conference3rd IEEE International Conference on Secure Software Integration Reliability Improvement, SSIRI 2009
CountryChina
CityShanghai
Period8/07/0910/07/09

Keywords

  • Authentication
  • Man-in-the-middle attack
  • Redirection attack
  • UMTS AKA

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Provable Secure AKA scheme with reliable key delegation in UMTS'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this