Optimal memoryless strategies of a two-rate communication link

Tsern-Huei Lee*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


Game theory has been applied to study the performance of a communication system in a hostile environment. By appropriately choosing the payoff, a communication system in the presence of a hostile jammer can be modeled as a finite two-person zero-sum game. In this paper, we model a two-rate communication link interfered by an on-off jammer as a two-person zero-sum game and derive the optimal memoryless communication and jamming strategies. The ensemble mean of the time average throughput is considered as the payoff to the communicator. It is found that, under average jamming power constraints, the optimal memoryless jamming strategy is, in general, to allocate as much jamming power as possible to one direction. We study both symmetric and asymmetric communication strategy cases. The performance of the communication system is better if an asymmetric communication strategy is adopted. However, the system resulting from an optimal asymmetric communication strategy may become non-ergodic.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)563-572
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of the Chinese Institute of Engineers, Transactions of the Chinese Institute of Engineers,Series A/Chung-kuo Kung Ch'eng Hsuch K'an
Issue number5
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1988


  • Ergodic
  • Memoryless
  • Saddlepoint

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