Embedded TaintTracker: Lightweight tracking of taint data against buffer overflow attacks

Ying-Dar Lin*, Fan Cheng Wu, Tze Yau Huang, Yuan Cheng Lai, Frank C. Lin

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Taint tracking is a novel technique to prevent buffer overflow. Previous studies on taint tracking ran a victim's program on an emulator to dynamically instrument the code for tracking the propagation of taint data in memory and checking whether malicious code is executed. However, the critical problem of this approach is its heavy performance overhead. This paper proposes a new taint-style system called Embedded TaintTracker to eliminate the overhead in the emulator and dynamic instrumentation by compressing a checking mechanism into the operating system (OS) kernel and moving the instrumentation from runtime to compilation time. Results show that the proposed system outperforms the previous work, TaintCheck, by at least 8 times on throughput degradation, and is about 17.5 times faster than TaintCheck when browsing 1KB web pages.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2010 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2010
DOIs
StatePublished - 13 Aug 2010
Event2010 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2010 - Cape Town, South Africa
Duration: 23 May 201027 May 2010

Publication series

NameIEEE International Conference on Communications
ISSN (Print)0536-1486

Conference

Conference2010 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2010
CountrySouth Africa
CityCape Town
Period23/05/1027/05/10

Keywords

  • Buffer overflow
  • Software security
  • Taint tracking

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