Coupons and price discrimination in vertically-correlated markets

Jin-Li Hu*, Yu Hsiu Chiou, Hong Hwang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

This research analyzes the non-cooperative and cooperative strategies with respect to manufacturer and retailer coupons. In a model with one manufacturer selling its product to one retailer, it is found that the retailer can achieve third-degree price discrimination equilibrium in retail markets by issuing coupons to demanders with higher elasticity. Although facing only one retailer, the manufacturer can also achieve the same third-degree price discrimination equilibrium by issuing coupons directly to demanders of higher elasticity. However, when only one firm issues the coupon, both manufacturer and retailer coupons can help alleviate the channel profit loss due to double marginalization. If the manufacturer and the retailer non-cooperatively issue coupons, then the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes are equivalent to those under the successive third-degree price discrimination. Moreover, cooperative strategies between the manufacturer and the retailer can eliminate double marginalization, achieve the vertical integration effect, and lead to higher profits, consumer surpluses, and social surpluses than non-cooperative coupon strategies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)29-40
Number of pages12
JournalManagerial and Decision Economics
Volume25
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2004

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