A practical and secure fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol

Wen-Guey Tzeng*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

18 Scopus citations

Abstract

When a group of people wants to communicate securely over an open network, they run a conference-key protocol to establish a common conference key K such that all their communications thereafter are encrypted with the key K. In this paper we propose a practical and provably secure fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol under the authenticated broadcast channel model. The adversary that attacks our protocol can be either active or passive. An active adversary (malicious participant) tries to disrupt establishment of a common conference key among the honest participants, while a passive adversary tries to learn the conference key by listening to the communication of participants. We show that a passive adversary gets no information (zero knowledge) about the conference key established by the honest participants under the assumption of a variant Diffie-Hellman decision problem. We also show that the honest participants can agree on a common conference key no matter how many participants are malicious.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPublic Key Cryptography - 3rd International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2000, Proceedings
EditorsHideki Imai, Yuliang Zheng
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages1-13
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)3540669671, 9783540669678
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2000
Event3rd International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2000 - Melbourne, Australia
Duration: 18 Jan 200020 Jan 2000

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume1751
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference3rd International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2000
CountryAustralia
CityMelbourne
Period18/01/0020/01/00

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    Tzeng, W-G. (2000). A practical and secure fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol. In H. Imai, & Y. Zheng (Eds.), Public Key Cryptography - 3rd International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2000, Proceedings (pp. 1-13). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 1751). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-46588-1_1